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BLD-027        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3295 
___________ 
 
FREDERICK WILLIAM KARASH, 
                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ERIE COUNTY MUNICIPALITY, As Represented by the Court of Common Pleas and 
the District Attorney’s Office; STEFANI DOMITROVICH, in her Individual and 
Official Capacity; CAROL SOUTHWORTH, in her Individual and Official Capacity; 
JACK DANERI, in his Individual and Official Capacity; NATE STRAUSSER, in his 
Individual and Official Capacity; ERIE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-00184) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 27, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 17, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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___________ 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Frederick Karash appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
amended complaint.1  The defendants have filed motions to summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.  For the reasons set forth below, we will grant those motions and 
summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
In December 2015, Karash filed an amended complaint in the District Court 
raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Erie County, the Erie County Court of 
Common Pleas, two state-court judges, and two district attorneys.  Karash alleged that the 
district-attorney defendants had brought “trumped up” speeding charges against him and 
that, rather than dismissing the charges, the judicial defendants made improper rulings 
and found him guilty of the offense.  He sought to enjoin the state action.2   
The defendants filed motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The 
District Court granted the motions and dismissed the amended complaint.  The District 
Court concluded that the action was barred by the Younger doctrine, see Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that most defendants were immune from liability, and that the 
                                              
1 The parties proceeded by consent before a Magistrate Judge.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
2 Karash also included in his amended complaint some allegations concerning a different 
encounter with police, but because he did not name those officers as defendants, did not 
seek relief related to that incident, and has pending a separate federal lawsuit that 
squarely presents those allegations, see W.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 1:15-cv-00028, we interpret 
his amended complaint here to discuss that incident merely as background.  Likewise, we 
acknowledge, as did the District Court, that Karash filed a second amended complaint 
that did not meaningfully differ from his amended complaint.   
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claims otherwise failed.  Karash filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.  The 
defendants have filed motions to summarily affirm.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise a plenary standard of 
review over the dismissal order.  See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 
188 (3d Cir. 2006).  We will take summary action if “no substantial question is 
presented.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 We agree with the District Court’s analysis of this case.  Federal courts will 
abstain under Younger when “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in 
nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state 
proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.”  Lui v. Comm’n, 
Adult Entm’t Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 326 (3d Cir. 2004).  As the District Court 
explained, these requirements are met here.  Karash’s state appellate proceedings are 
ongoing, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608-09 (1975) (Younger doctrine 
applies during pendency of state appellate proceedings), and the proceedings implicate 
Pennsylvania’s important interest in enforcing its criminal traffic laws, see Sprint 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013); see also Commonwealth v. Failor, 
770 A.2d 310, 313 (Pa. 2001) (treating type of proceedings at issue here as criminal).  
Moreover, Karash can raise the claims he presents here in state court.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 868 A.2d 1253, 1256-57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (considering 
federal constitutional claims).  Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that the 
Younger doctrine applies here.   
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 While Younger abstention is not appropriate “in cases of proven harassment or 
prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid 
conviction” or “in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be 
shown,” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971), none of these narrow exceptions is 
satisfied here.  Karash argues that a district attorney “harassed” him by stating that he 
would increase the charges if Karash did not plead guilty; this is not sufficient to warrant 
federal interference.  See Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 
1992) (“even a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness will not suffice to overcome the 
general principle that federal review of a criminal prosecution is unavailable before the 
state proceeding is completed”); see generally Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802 
(1989) (noting that the Court has “upheld the prosecutorial practice of threatening a 
defendant with increased charges if he does not plead guilty, and following through on 
that threat if the defendant insists on his right to stand trial”).  Nor has Karash 
meaningfully shown that the prosecution was frivolous — an argument that would be 
undermined by the fact that he was convicted and has thus far been unsuccessful in 
setting aside that judgment on appeal — or that other extraordinary circumstances are 
present.  We thus agree with the District Court’s abstention decision.   
Accordingly, we will grant the defendants’ motions and summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  
